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I am honored to have been invited to present this Madison Lecture,
and I want to thank my hosts, Robby George and Brad Wilson, for their 
hospitality and for the excellence achieved by the Madison Program 
under their stewardship. 
My charge was to present something on constitutional theory. Now, 
as you shall see, I do work in one corner of constitutional theory, and of
course I believe it is the right corner to work in and that all constitutional 
theorists should be working in my corner.  The baleful truth, however, is 
that most constitutional theorists reject that claim, despite several articles 
of mine urging them to do otherwise. So, to date, I have failed in my
* © 2014 Larry Alexander.  Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San 
Diego School of Law. Thanks to Will Baude and Kim Ferzan for their comments and
Alessandria Driussi for her stenographic assistance. 
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normative aspirations regarding constitutional theory, and this lecture 
will steer clear of preaching to the unconverted. 
What I intend to do instead is to categorize the extant approaches to 
constitutional theory, including mine.  I am going to taxonomize rather 
than criticize; although, I confess, some criticisms will seep through, albeit 
mainly implicitly.
I. THE MORALISTS
The first group of constitutional theorists I wish to discuss I label the 
“moralists.”  These theorists view the Constitution—at least large parts 
of it—and thus constitutional law as an invitation to implement their 
favorite moral theory as the law of the land.  Some moralists claim that
the Constitution itself, in phrases such as “due process of law” or “equal 
protection of the laws,” invites judges to do moral theory and then 
impose that theory’s strictures as constitutional law, supreme over all
other law.1 Others view the point of the Constitution to be the legal 
implementation and protection of our preexisting moral rights.2  In their 
view, any attempted derogation from those rights would be a constitutional 
nullity regardless of the Constitution’s specific text.3 
Constitutional moralists come in all political shades.  Some are on the 
left of the political spectrum.  A generation ago, David A.J. Richards 
“found” in the Constitution a Rawlsian theory of justice.4  Somewhat  
earlier, in his famous Foreword to the Harvard Law Review, Frank
Michelman argued that the Fourteenth Amendment could serve as the 
basis for a judicially ordered and Rawlsian-justified redistribution of 
wealth.5  Much more recently, Larry Sager has postulated that the
Constitution is incorrigible and is “justice-seeking,” even if not all of the 
justice it seeks should be implemented by judges.6  Because Sager does 
not think constitutional interpreters are bound by the Constitution’s 
1. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996).
2. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387–88 (1798) (Chase, J.). 
3. See id. 
4. See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
13 (1989) (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 195–257 (1999)); see also DAVID 
A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 41 (1986) (citing the same).
5. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On 
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 14–15
(1969).
6. See LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN 
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original meaning,7 it is not clear to me on his view what prevents the 
Constitution from achieving justice rather than merely seeking it. 
Ronald Dworkin merits special attention as a constitutional moralist of 
the left. Sometimes Dworkin supports constitutional leftism through his 
general interpretive theory of law, including constitutional law.8  For 
Dworkin, the law of a community is determined by asking what are the
most morally acceptable principles that fit a sizeable fraction of legal 
materials—the Constitution, statutes, administrative rules, court decisions,
and so on.9  Indeed, even the content of those legal materials is not fixed 
but is itself interpreted by reference to moral principles.10  I have criticized 
Dworkin’s theory in depth elsewhere and will not repeat those criticisms.11 
All I wish to point out here is that Dworkin’s general approach to law 
allows him to “find” his favored moral principles in the Constitution. 
At other times, however, Dworkin gets to his liberal principles of 
constitutional law by a more conventional route, one that does not rely
on his general theory of law.  Instead, like some of the other moralists, 
he claims that those principles accord with the semantic intentions of the 
Framers and are nothing more than what was the semantic meaning of 
specific provisions of the Constitution.12 
7. See id. at 30, 35, 42–69. 
8. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
EQUALITY 370–71 (2000).
9. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 355–99 (1986). 
10. See id. at 225–75. 
11. These criticisms are found in Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal
Principles, in  LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 279 (Andrei
Marmor ed., 1995) and Lawrence Alexander & Michael Bayles, Hercules or Proteus? 
The Many Theses of Ronald Dworkin, 5 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 267 (1980). These 
criticisms include: Dworkin never makes clear how one is to fix the legal content for
purposes of “fit,” given that the “law” is itself the product of fit and acceptability; Dworkin
gives no convincing rationale for the diachronic equality that he claims underlies the fit 
requirement and that in theory should apply to legislatures as well as courts—and furthering
diachronic equality, in contrast to taking account of reliance interests, is perverse and 
untenable; moral acceptability will dictate the morally proper level of fit and will not 
give effect to past moral errors except insofar as they have created reliance interests; and 
on Dworkin’s theory, legislation may fail to change the “law” in the way the legislature 
intended, despite what most of us believe. 
12. See Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 












    
 
 











     
        
  
Those theorists—Richards, Michelman, Sager, and Dworkin—represent 
the moralists of the left.13  There are, however, moralists of the right. 
The latter see the Constitution as an attempt to implement the natural 
law—a natural law of a distinctly conservative or libertarian hue. 
One such moralist of the right is Hadley Arkes.  Arkes argues that, in
interpreting the Constitution, one must go beyond its text to first
principles—principles that are antecedent to it.14  And although he would
strenuously resist being labeled as on the right, because his moral views 
are implicitly libertarian,15 and because he believes all law, including 
constitutional law, must be interpreted to accord with moral reality,16 I 
shall put my good friend, Michael Moore, perhaps much to his chagrin, 
into the camp of constitutional moralists who are at least somewhat on 
the right.
II. THE POLITICAL THEORISTS 
My next category of constitutional theorists contains those who
“interpret” the Constitution as the implementation of a political theory.
Now I realize that hiving off the political theorists from the moralists is 
13. I should also mention as moral theorists of the left in constitutional theory 
James Fleming and Sotirios Barber, whose approaches and conclusions closely resemble 
those of Dworkin.  See generally SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS 155–70, 189–92 (2007) (describing competing 
philosophical approaches to constitutional interpretation and focusing on Dworkin’s 
fusion of constitutional law and moral philosophy). 
14. See, e.g., HADLEY ARKES, BEYOND THE CONSTITUTION 10–11, 16–17 (1990). 
15. I say this because Moore believes duties to aid are much weaker than duties 
not to harm, a view that has libertarian implications.  See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, 
CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS 55–56 
(2009).
16. See, for example, Moore’s view of constitutional interpretation in MICHAEL S. 
MOORE, EDUCATING ONESELF IN PUBLIC 439–42 (2000).  Moore’s natural law theory of 
interpretation is complex because he realizes there is a moral value served by interpreting 
legal texts as ordinary communications and opaque to whatever moral values those 
communications might serve or disserve.  Nevertheless, he compromises that opacity and 
allows some adjustment between treating the text as an ordinary communication and as 
merely a conduit to correct moral values.  I view the relation between the authorial meaning of 
a legal text and the correct moral values any such text is meant to serve as presenting an
irresolvable practical dilemma.  As I have put it in several pieces, there is an inevitable 
“gap” between the content of morally desirable legal rules and the moral desirability of the 
actions or forbearances those rules command.  That gap is elaborated and explored most
fully in LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES 53–95 (2001).
Moore’s approach either fails to eliminate that gap or else collapses legal texts, including the
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somewhat arbitrary, given that the former generally put forward their
political theory in service of a moral theory.  Indeed, David Richards,
whom I have labeled a moralist, refers to his views as political theory.17 
Still, as a matter of emphasis at least, the political rather than the moral
theory is dominant in the political theorists’ approach to the Constitution. 
My two leading exemplars here are John Ely and Richard Epstein. 
Ely famously reads the Constitution as a whole and almost all of its
clauses as in service of “representation-reinforcement.”18  Therefore, he
argues, constitutional interpretation should further that political value.19 
In the background is basically a moral theory of preference-satisfaction
utilitarianism; but it is the political value of representation-reinforcement, 
not the morality of utilitarianism, that does the constitutional work in 
Ely’s theory. 
Richard Epstein also reads the Constitution through a political lens.
For example, in his book Takings, he argues for a very broad interpretation
of the takings clause20 to prevent wealth-diminishing rent-seeking.21 
And in a number of other works on constitutional law, Epstein’s major 
concern is to interpret constitutional law so as to prevent wealth-diminishing 
political policies.22  Although Epstein’s prescriptions will generally be
congenial to Lockean libertarians, his ultimate moral justification for his 
constitutional prescriptions is a utilitarian one.23  As with Ely, however, 
Epstein’s political theory, not his moral one, is what is prominent in his 
approach to the Constitution. 
Ely and Epstein read their political theories into the Constitution as a 
whole. Others read certain clauses through the lens of political theory. 
For example, Don Regan would read the commerce clause24 as 
implementing the political theory of subsidiarity—the theory that holds 
17. See supra text accompanying note 4. 
18. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
19. See id. 
20. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
21. See  RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (discussing the conflict between citizens’ private rights to own 
property and the state’s power to take property coercively).
22. This is a common Epstein theme running from his 1985 book on takings through 
his most recent book, RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE 
UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT (2014).
23. See EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 5. 


















     
     
 
that regulation should be implemented by the lowest level of government 
that can avoid spillovers and collective action problems.25  A similar 
approach to that clause has been advocated by Robert Cooter and Neil 
Seigel.26  Neither Regan nor Cooter and Siegel claim that their political
principle is how the authors of the commerce clause intended the clause
to be interpreted.27  Rather, as with Ely and Epstein, they argue for reading 
their political theory into the clause rather than drawing it out of the clause. 
* * * * * * 
At this point, lest I be misunderstood, I should emphasize that none of 
my moralists or political theorists completely ignore the actual Constitution.
Nor would they admit that they were not interpreting it.  Rather, they
would claim that underlying the Constitution, or at least certain of its 
clauses, are certain moral and political truths and that the Constitution 
was an attempt by fallible human beings to realize those truths.  They
are, they would say, faithfully interpreting the Constitution by resorting 
to the more abstract intentions of the Constitution’s authors rather than
their more concrete ones.  They are interpreting those authorial intentions at
a high level of generality and translating them in light of what is morally, 
politically, and factually true. 
Notice, however, that at the highest level of generality, constitutional 
authors want to do what is right, just, and most conducive to good
government. The moralist and political theorist interpreters can therefore 
always claim that they, the interpreters, are, in implementing their favorite 
moral or political theories, doing what the constitutional authors wanted 
them to do, however much the theories of the interpreters are at odds
with the constitutional authors’ beliefs and more specific constitutional
intentions.  Constitutional fidelity in interpretation comes easily—I would 
say far too easily—if one ascends to the highest level of generality of the 
constitutional authors’ intentions. 
25. Donald H. Regan, How To Think About the Federal Commerce Power and 
Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 555–58 (1995). 
26. Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General 
Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 117–19 (2010). 














   
  













[VOL. 51:  623, 2014] Constitutional Theories 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
III. THE JURISTOCRATIC AND LIVING CONSTITUTION THEORISTS 
My next category of theorists includes those who put judicial decision 
making at the center of constitutional law.  The most notable contemporary 
academic advocate of constitutional juristocracy is David Strauss.
Strauss is a proponent of “living constitutionalism,” in which judges 
develop constitutional doctrine in common law fashion.28  The Constitution 
itself—or, not to beg any questions, the text of the Constitution—is fully 
present only at the outset of the development of constitutional law.29 
From there, development takes place the way common law development
takes place—through precedents building upon precedents.30  Constitutional 
law becomes judge-made law, not law made by those who drafted and 
ratified the document in the National Archives.31 
Strauss’s common law constitutionalism surely has a number of 
proponents in the academy and practitioners in the courts, including the
Supreme Court.32  Moreover, Strauss denies that this approach throws
the Constitution aside. Like some of the moralists and political theorists 
who find warrant for pushing their values as constitutional law, Strauss 
argues that common law constitutionalism is really what the constitutional 
authors had in mind in certain constitutional clauses, such as those
referring to equal protection, due process, and freedom of speech.33  The
constitutional authors expected judges to keep up with the times and its 
demands rather than to preserve in amber the authors’ own gloss on those
clauses, or so Strauss argues.34  What differentiates Strauss’s view of these 
clauses from the moralists’ and political theorists’ views of them is that 
28. See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) (developing 
and applying the concept of a living constitution through developments in the common
law).
29. See id. at 33. 
30. See id. at 3, 35. 
31. See id. at 34–35. 
32. See, e.g., id. at 53–54 (discussing the Supreme Court’s application of common
law constitutionalism in the context of the First Amendment); see also Abigail R. Moncrieff, 
Common-Law Constitutionalism, the Constitutional Common Law, and the Validity of
the Individual Mandate, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1245, 1246 (2012) (critiquing Strauss’s common law
constitution philosophy).
33. See STRAUSS, supra note 28, at 112–14. 
34. See id. 
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Strauss does not see them as invitations to do moral or political theory— 
although, of course, at some level Strauss is doing that himself. 
A related view, but one that places less emphasis on judges, is Jack 
Balkin’s “living originalism.”35  Balkin claims his view is originalist
because he believes it is faithful to the original meanings of the
Constitution’s provisions.36  Some of those provisions, however—much
the same ones that Strauss invokes—state broad principles, the content
of which is contested and contestable.37 And like Strauss, Balkin does 
not claim that these principles should, as a matter of their meaning, be 
elaborated as his own moral views would dictate.38  Unlike Strauss,
however, Balkin does not make judges the central actors in the drama of
these principles’ elaboration.39  Rather, he sees social movements and 
political contests as the crucibles in which their meanings are fleshed
out.40  The courts then ratify those meanings in their constitutional
decisions.41  But social movements and politics are the major engines of
constitutional development, not judges.42 
IV. THE PRACTICE THEORISTS 
My next group of constitutional theorists includes those who view 
constitutional law as what we do when we do constitutional law.  In other 
words, in their view, constitutional law is entirely self-referential.
The most influential proponent of such a view is Philip Bobbitt.43  Bobbitt 
claims that there are six modalities of constitutional argument—historical,
textual, structural, prudential, doctrinal, and ethical—and that although 
35. See generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) (presenting Balkin’s
view that an originalist interpretation of the Constitution and the flexibility to adapt to
changing public values are compatible). 
36. Id. at 3. 
37. Id. at 232. 
38. See id. at 256. 
39. See id. at 279. 
40. See id. at 81–89. 
41. See id. at 89–93. 
42. See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). Balkin
distinguishes his living constitutionalism from Bruce Ackerman’s theory of constitutional 
change.  Balkin correctly sees Ackerman’s notion of constitutional moments as an account of
constitutional revolutions rather than as an account of changing meanings given an unchanged 
Constitution. See BALKIN, supra note 35, at 309–12. 
43. Bobbitt develops his views in two books: PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) [hereinafter BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE];



















    
  
   









[VOL. 51:  623, 2014] Constitutional Theories 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
these overlap, they are distinct.44  None can be reduced to another.45 
Moreover, they are not related hierarchically, with some modalities lexically
superior to others.46 
I have argued elsewhere that the modalities view of constitutional law 
is a nest of confusions.47 As I put it, the fact that lawyers argue for a
specific outcome by invoking whichever modality favors their position 
does not mean the Constitution is nothing but the argumentative practice 
of invoking these modalities.48  When lawyers invoke history, text,
structure, prudence, doctrine, or ethics, they are claiming the factor they
are invoking, not their practice of invoking it, is the law.49 
Second, the Constitution cannot be all of these modalities 
simultaneously.50  Indeed, unless the modalities were lexically ordered, 
so that, for example, original meaning trumped precedent—doctrine—or 
vice versa, the Constitution could only be one of them.51  That is because
they cannot be coherently combined.52  Trying to combine original meaning 
with precedent and with justice would be, as I put it, like “combining”
pi, green, and the Civil War.53 
Given their nonlexical relationship with each other and their inability
to be combined, when two lawyers invoke different modalities in a 
constitutional case, they are either arguing past each other rather than 
with each other, or else they are asking the court to choose their favored
modality, at least for this case.54  I say “at least for this case” because the 
modalities are supposed to persist even if they failed to prevail in various 
55cases. 
44. See  BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 43, at 8; BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 43, at 12–22. 
45. See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 43, at 22. 
46. See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 43, at 8. 
47. Larry Alexander, Telepathic Law, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 139, 146 (2010).
This paragraph and the following three paragraphs are a close paraphrase of pages 146 







54. Id. at 146–47. 



















     
 
       
  
    









In truth, each modality represents a different Constitution.56  In the  
historical modality, the Constitution is that set of norms intended by the 
historical Constitution’s authors.57  In the doctrinal modality, the
Constitution is that set of norms established by Supreme Court 
precedents.58  In the ethical modality, the Constitution is the set of norms
the interpreter believes are morally best.59  Because these modalities cannot 
be meaningfully combined, and because it strains credulity that when 
advocates employ a modality they are asking the court to choose a 
Constitution for this case only, the modalities view of constitutional
theory collapses.60 
The other practice theory of note is that of Mitch Berman.  Berman 
argues that law in general, including constitutional law, is an
“argumentative practice.”61  Berman claims that legal decisions can rest, 
not on the truth about some preexisting norm or on mere choice, but on
the better argument.62  Because legal arguments invoke quite disparate 
considerations—considerations that are incommensurable—decisions 
responding to such arguments cannot be responding to some metaphysical 
truth but to a sense of which arguments are weightier or more reasonable.63 






60. Id.  As I stated in Telepathic Law, 
My suspicion is that the appearance of several modalities is produced for the 
following reasons. First, the original meaning and erroneous judicial accounts of
that original meaning that are embodied in precedents create two conflicting 
sources of legal authority. Second, considerations of justice cannot, as I have
said, be combined with original meaning or precedent.  Nor can justice compete
with original meaning given that the purpose of having authoritative legal texts
and tribunals is to settle authoritatively what justice requires.  At most,
considerations of justice can be invoked when an authoritative standard needs 
to be given content, or invoked as evidence of original meaning.  All the other 
modalities mentioned by Bobbitt and others can, I believe, be shown to be 
derivative of original meaning or precedent.
Id.
61. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Theory and the Rule of Recognition: Toward a 
Fourth Theory of Law, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 269, 
285 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009). 
62. See id. at 288. 
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Without an ontological account of the Constitution and its norms, one 
that is external to the practice of legal argumentation, how can we tell if 
a constitutional argument is weighty or reasonable? In another piece,
Berman argues that we do so by a method of “reflective equilibrium” in
which we consult our constitutional intuitions as well as the Constitution’s 
text, precedent, and so forth.64 
Berman gives as an example of how his methodology might work the 
controversy over whether John McCain was ineligible to become President 
because of the Constitution’s requirement that the President be a “natural
born citizen.”65 McCain had been born to American parents in the Panama
Canal Zone, then a U.S. territory.66  The meaning of natural born citizen 
and thus whether it includes citizens like McCain has never been 
authoritatively resolved.67  Berman argues that despite this, most legal
practitioners had a strong “conviction” that McCain was constitutionally 
eligible and that their conviction was not contingent on the original 
meaning of the clause.68  That conviction, Berman claims, is a datum for 
reflective equilibrium, and it might prevail over other data, such as the 
original meaning and precedent.69 
I confess I do not understand Berman’s notion of intuitions or
convictions about what the law, including the Constitution, requires.  Of
course, I have convictions about what good laws would require. And my
familiarity with history and culture allows me to predict what a particular 
country’s constitution probably contains.  But on matters like the natural 
born citizen clause, although I have a conviction about which of its 
possible meanings would be best as a matter of policy, and a prediction 
regarding what the authors of the Constitution most likely meant by it, I 
would surely not deem the former to be the clause’s meaning, nor would 
the latter withstand strong evidence to the contrary.
64. Mitchell N. Berman, Reflective Equilibrium and Constitutional Method: Lessons
from John McCain and the Natural-Born Citizenship Clause, in  THE CHALLENGE OF 
ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 246, 258–60 (Grant Huscroft &
Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011). 
65. Id. at 261–73.  The natural born citizen clause of the Constitution states, “No 
person except a natural born citizen . . . shall be eligible to the Office of President . . . .”
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
66. Berman, supra note 64, at 261. 
67. Id. at 262. 
68. Id. at 248. 
69. See id. at 267–69, 273–74. 
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Here is how I put my objection to Berman’s reflective equilibrium 
approach in earlier pieces:
With respect to reflective equilibrium, which I agree is an appropriate 
methodology for determining one’s moral views, that method is completely
inappropriate when it comes to the content of specific posited stuff and to other
specific facts. Did or did not the framers put the specific language regarding
“natural born Citizen” in Article II?  That question—to which the answer is
“yes”—is not resolved by reflective equilibrium any more than is the question
how high in feet is New Zealand’s Mt. Cook.  Or if reflective equilibrium does
apply to these questions because we must achieve coherence among all of our
empirical beliefs—our beliefs about whether there is a natural born
citizen clause in the Constitution and the height of Mt. Cook must cohere with
our beliefs about the trustworthiness of our eyesight, of geographers’ measuring
devices, of those who print legal materials, of encyclopedias’ renditions of
others’ reports, and so on—then the objection to applying reflective equilibrium
as Berman does devolves into a denial that we have case-specific constitutional
or, more generally, legal intuitions of the type on which Berman relies.
Berman asserts that without knowing the intended meaning of “natural born 
Citizen” in Article II, we can have confident intuitions that John McCain was
constitutionally eligible to be President, despite his birth in the Panama Canal
Zone to U.S. citizens, and that President Warren Harding was likewise
constitutionally eligible, despite his having been born by Caesarian section.
I deny, however, that one does or can have constitutional or legal intuitions that
pre-exist and provide the grist for building our theory of legal interpretation. 
Take away the texts of posited law, which, as I have said, are nothing other than
the media by which legal authorities’ intended meanings are conveyed, and we
have no case-specific legal intuitions at all. Of course, we might have some
general sense of what reasonable and just laws would look like, and we might
assume that most laws—in western democracies at least, if not in North
Korea—would be relatively reasonable and just.  Thus, we might, in the absence
of the texts, have decent surmises about the general content of the laws. But I
doubt that we have any case-specific intuitions about whether “titles of nobility” 
are constitutionally outlawed; whether states can issue “letters of marque and
reprisal;” the date on which presidential elections must be held; whether one
state can split into two or more; when recess appointments expire; or countless 
other matters that the constitutional authors address—much less the length of
the statute of limitations for fraud in Alabama.70 
70. Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in  THE CHALLENGE OF 
ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 64, at 87, 97– 
98 (footnotes omitted).  Reflective equilibrium in moral epistemology imposes no priori 
restrictions on our ability to modify our case-specific intuitions in light of more general 
principles and vice versa.  In legal reasoning, however, some data points—specific texts—are 
unalterable.  Reflective equilibrium cannot operate as it does in moral reasoning and therefore 
the practice theories cannot appropriate its epistemological credentials in their behalf.
See Jeremy Waldron, Do Judges Reason Morally?, in  EXPOUNDING THE CONSTITUTION:
ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 38, 52–53 (Grant Huscroft ed., 2008). 
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My hunch is that the legal intuitions argument gets whatever force it has in
cases where the original meaning is unclear and where we think considerations
of policy or justice strongly favor one possible meaning over the other.  That 
explains whatever force Berman’s examples have.  On the other hand, where the
mistakenly assumed original meaning is viewed as neutral or as undesirable, the 
“legal intuition” view has no purchase. Most people, for example, probably wish
that the Fourteenth Amendment had not granted birthright U.S. citizenship to
the children of aliens temporarily or illegally in the country.  No other country 
does this, and there are no good reasons to do it.  Still, almost everyone assumes 
and has assumed for a long time that the Fourteenth Amendment dictates this
result. If we now become convinced by scholars . . . that this interpretation is
erroneous . . . would we still want to say that the new interpretation was not the
law? I think not.71 
Let me conclude this section with a final verdict on the constitutional 
law as an argumentative practice view of which Bobbitt and Berman are 
principal proponents: I find the view to be deeply incoherent.  Either our 
arguments about the Constitution have an external object or they do not. 
If the latter and they are self-referential, then they are self-undermining, 
for we cannot sensibly argue about whether we are arguing.
The view that the Constitution is an “argumentative practice” represents a
category mistake.72  It substitutes an external point of view that an observer 
of constitutional arguments might hold—namely, that constitutional law 
appears to be a series of never-ending arguments—for the internal point
of view of those engaged in the arguments.73  Argument over the
Constitution’s meaning does not show that the meaning is itself an 
argumentative practice any more than arguments among physicists about 
the number of dimensions of the universe or the nature of elementary 
particles showed that the dimensions of the universe and the nature of 
elementary particles are themselves argumentative practices.74  From the
internal point of view of the participants in constitutional arguments, the 
Constitution and its meaning are external to their arguments—they are 
what those arguments are about.75 
71. Alexander, supra note 47, at 149–50 (footnotes omitted). 





























      
  
     
  
V. THE ANTICONSTITUTIONALISTS
I have labeled my next group of constitutional theorists 
“anticonstitutionalists” because they wish to demote the Constitution’s 
status and importance. They are particularly hostile to judicial review 
and especially to the judicial supremacy view of Cooper v. Aaron.76 
Mark Tushnet falls into this category.  In 1999, he published Taking 
the Constitution Away from the Courts, the principal theses of which are
a rejection of judicial supremacy and the advocacy of the “thin” 
Constitution rather than the “thick” one.77  The latter is the actual
Constitution in all its detail.78  The former consists of basic principles, 
such as equality, freedom of expression, and liberty.79  Tushnet argues
that judicial supremacy is neither necessary nor desirable on behalf of
the thin Constitution.80  Legislative action, which Tushnet calls “populist
constitutional law,” is where the thin Constitution is best secured.81  And 
because legislative action cannot be entrenched against reversal by
subsequent legislative action, the Constitution on Tushnet’s view will
turn out to be “fundamental law” and supreme over ordinary law only, if 
at all, in the minds of the citizenry and their legislative representatives.82 
Another anticonstitutionalist is Louis Michael Seidman, Tushnet’s 
long-time colleague and occasional coauthor.83  Seidman’s book, Our
Unsettled Constitution, makes a case against settling fundamental matters in
a Constitution.84  Seidman’s point is that any such settlement will appear
erroneous to some people at some point, and they will contest its legitimacy,
especially if democratic contestation of that settlement is foreclosed by 
76. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
77. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 7, 9–14
(1999).
78. Id. at 9. 
79. Id. at 11. 
80. See id. 
81. See id. at 12. 
82. See id. at 13–14.  Interestingly, many believe that judicial review is most 
necessary for matters arising under the thick Constitution, especially those matters that 
determine the rules under which ordinary politics is conducted, such as how Congress 
and the President are chosen, how a bill becomes law, who can make a treaty or appoint
executive officers, and so on.  Major disputes over these matters, although they might be 
handled satisfactorily without the intervention of the courts as neutral arbiters, might not 
be, with the consequence that politics might devolve into anarchy.
83. See, e.g., LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF 
BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (1996).
84. See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED  CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE 
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strong-form judicial review of the Cooper v. Aaron kind.85  I believe that
at its deepest level, Seidman’s worry is a worry about whether not only 
constitutional law, but any law, can be viewed as normative by those 
who disagree with its content—which is the only time the normativity of
law matters.86 
A recent prominent entrant in the list of anticonstitutionalists is Larry
Kramer. Kramer calls his position “popular constitutionalism” because 
he, like Tushnet and Seidman, opposes judicial supremacy and supports
vesting “the people” with ultimate authority over constitutional 
interpretation.87  Kramer is vague about the interpretive methodology
the people should employ.88  He is clear, however, that constitutional law is
not ordinary law of a higher rank, something the Constitution itself seems to
imply.89  As he puts it,
Constitutional or fundamental law subsisted as an independent modality, distinct 
from both politics and from the ordinary law interpreted and enforced by courts.
It was a special category of law.  It possessed critical attributes of ordinary law:
its obligations were meant to be binding, for example, and its content was not a 
matter of mere will or policy but reflected rules whose meaning was determined
by argument based on precedent, analogy, and principle.  Yet constitutional law
also purported to govern the sovereign itself, thus generating controversies that 
were inherently matters for resolution in a political domain.  Modern discourse 
has so thoroughly conflated the meaning of “constitution” with “law” and of
“law” with “courts” that we no longer possess the language to describe a distinct 
category of this sort; the best way to capture its essence today may thus be (as
one leading historian has done) to call it “political-legal.”90 
My final anticonstitutionalist is Jeremy Waldron.  Like the others,
Waldron is a fierce opponent of strong judicial review, but unlike Kramer,
who reposes constitutional interpretation vaguely in “the people,” Waldron 
argues specifically for legislative supremacy in constitutional law.91  The
85. See id. at 55. 
86. I shall return to this topic at the conclusion of my lecture. 
87. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 24–25, 28–32 (2004).
88. See Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1603, 1621–26 (2005) (reviewing KRAMER, supra note 87). 
89. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land . . . .”). 
90. KRAMER, supra note 87, at 24 (footnotes omitted). 
91. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE 
L.J. 1346, 1353, 1387–88 (2006). 
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underlying value motivating Waldron is that of equality, which for him
extends to equality of say over the meaning of constitutional principles.92 
What unites the anticonstitutionalists is their hostility to strong judicial 
review and to viewing the 1789 Constitution and its amendments as 
ordinary law, fit for ordinary legal analysis and craft.  Judges are adept at 
the latter.  If, however, the Constitution is not merely ordinary law of the 
highest rank, but not ordinary law at all, then its meaning is not necessarily 
within the special ken of lawyers and judges. As best I can tell, the
anticonstitutionalists regard the Constitution as the name we give to the 
locus of political clashes over our most fundamental ideals rather than a 
legal document produced by specific people at a specific time.
VI. THE ORIGINALISTS 
My final category of constitutional theorists is that of the originalists.
Originalists regard the Constitution as an historical artifact, a legal
document posited by certain people following certain procedures at
specific times.93  For originalists, the Constitution is just a super statute 
enacted in a particular way.  Apart from its supremacy over other law,
the Constitution is just ordinary law and should be interpreted as if it 
were ordinary law.94 
Originalists divide into two camps with respect to how that interpretation 
should proceed.  They agree that the meaning of a constitutional provision 
is fixed at the time the provision is enacted and is unchanging thereafter.
They disagree, however, about what that meaning is.  A few, including 
me, believe that the meaning of a constitutional provision is its authorially
intended meaning. The majority of originalists believe that a provision’s
meaning is its “original public meaning.”95  For short, I shall designate
the first view, the one I hold, as the originally-intended meaning view or 
“OIM.” I shall designate the original public meaning view as “OPM.” 
Those of us in the OIM camp view the positing of law, including 
constitutional law, as the communication of norms chosen by those with
authority to choose them to those who will be subject to them.  The authors’ 
intention in the communication is to produce in their audience the uptake 
92. See Jeremy Waldron, Precommitment and Disagreement, in CONSTITUTIONALISM:
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 271, 280–81 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998). 
93. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, The Method of Text and ?: Jack Balkin’s Originalism 
with No Regrets, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 611. 
94. See id. at 612. 
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that corresponds to the authors’ intended meaning.  And the audience’s 
task is to ascertain the meaning that the authors intended.  On this view, 
posited law, including the Constitution, is just ordinary communication 
applied to the communication of legal norms. 
Now, there are two real problems that the OIM view must grapple 
with. One problem is that even the authors themselves may not know 
whether they intended their norm to cover certain specific applications. 
The authors of “no vehicles in the park” may be able to answer yes or no
to questions such as “Did you intend to cover bicycles?” and “Did you
intend to cover ambulances?” but be unable to answer “Did you intend 
to cover skateboards?” When the authors do not know what meaning 
they intended, then there is no intended meaning for the audience to
discover. 
The second problem for the proponents of OIM, one that is oft noted, 
is that of collective authorship.  Whenever the authorities whose intended 
meanings matter are a group, the question naturally arises whether a group 
can have an intended meaning.  Must all members of the group share the 
meaning, or at least all members necessary for the norm’s enactment? 
It was largely in response to this second problem of OIM that most 
originalists adopted OPM.96  For OPM rests not on the meaning intended
by a group but on the meaning that a single individual—some
representative or idealized member of the public at the time of the 
enactment of the provision in question—would understand to be the 
meaning of that provision.97 
Unfortunately for originalists, if OIM is the frying pan of group intent
problems, OPM is a fire of much more formidable ones.  First, there is
no nonarbitrary way to ascertain or construct the member of the public
whose understanding of a constitutional provision is to be determinative.98 
I have written at length about this problem elsewhere and so shall be 
brief here.99  As I described the problem in a footnote, 
96. See id. 
97. See id. 
98. See id. at 89–90. 
99. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re 
Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
967, 976 (2004). 
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. . . [S]uppose we could ask every member of the public in 1791 what he or she 
believed, say, “freedom of speech” meant.  Each member of the public would differ,
even if only slightly, in terms of their linguistic facility, their understanding of
the general purposes motivating the language of the First Amendment, their
familiarity with the debates in Congress and in the state ratifying conventions
over the Bill of Rights, and so on.  There is no such thing as an “average” of
what the members of the public believed the ratifiers meant by “freedom of speech.” 
Nor is there a “median” of such meanings.  So one would have to look for the 
meaning attributed to “freedom of speech” by some “representative” member of
the public. But what linguistic facility, familiarity with current events, geographical
location, and so on make one a representative member of the public?  I do not 
see any non-arbitrary way of choosing.100 
Even if we could, contrary to fact, nonarbitrarily construct the member 
of the public whose interpretation is to be authoritative under OPM—I 
will call her Mary—why should we care how Mary understood the 
meaning?  After all, Mary herself would not be seeking the OPM—her 
meaning—but would presumably be seeking the OIM. Moreover, for 
there to be any space between OIM and OPM, Mary will have to have 
gotten OIM wrong in certain situations. So why should we follow Mary’s 
erroneous conclusion about OIM rather than our own differing and, as 
far as we can tell, correct conclusion about OIM?  The proponents of 
OPM have never answered this question.
One worry I have heard voiced by OPM proponents is that the actual 
authors might have had secret intended meanings that differed from the 
meanings they expected their audience to receive.101  But this worry is
completely wrongheaded.  One’s intended meaning in a communication 
just is the uptake the speaker intends in his audience.  One cannot intend 
to communicate meaning X and intend one’s audience to have meaning 
Y as its uptake. 
The second worry I have heard voiced is that it is somehow unfair for 
people to be governed by norms the actual meaning of which might only
become apparent at a later date.  Again, this worry is wrongheaded.  As I 
put it elsewhere, 
. . . [S]uppose the authors of the Constitution in saying A intended meaning X, 
but the hypothetical contemporary member of the public would have taken them
to have intended meaning Y.  It is only later that we come to believe they
intended X by A.  Was the public in the interim treated unfairly in assuming Y 
rather than X?  It is hard to see how.  Obviously, if the hypothetical member of 
the public were ratifying the Constitution, the meaning he was assuming would 
be important to him.  But if he assumed it was Y, it would be Y, because as a 
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ratifier, he is the author and is intending Y as the meaning.  If he is not a ratifier,
then he has to show that he has been somehow harmed by mistakenly believing 
the actual authors meant Y rather than X.  Although misinterpretations—especially
authoritative ones, such as Supreme Court decisions—can induce detrimental 
reliance, so can misinterpretations of OPM. Detrimental reliance on erroneous
interpretations is a problem, but it is not solved by denying that erroneous 
interpretations are erroneous.102 
Nor can OPM avoid the collective authorship problem of OIM, the 
avoidance of which was supposed to be a principal attraction of OPM. 
For suppose that a provision lacks a single meaning intended by its authors.
Rather, there are conflicting intended meanings within the authorial 
body.  But if so, then Mary, our hypothetical member of the 
contemporaneous public, whose interpretation is supposed to be 
authoritative under OPM, will herself be unable to interpret the provision.
For remember that Mary cannot herself be seeking the OPM.  Rather, 
she must be seeking the OIM.  If that fails to provide her with a meaning,
she cannot provide a meaning for the rest of us. OPM is ultimately
parasitic on OIM. 
VII. THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE HARDEST 
QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
It is time, finally, for me to look down upon these conflicting 
constitutional theories from more Olympian heights.  And the first thing 
to note is that almost every one of these theories could be correct as a
theory of our constitutional law.  For our constitutional law, like all law,
turns on what we, the people, recognize as the ultimate ground of legal 
authority—what Hart calls the rule of recognition.103 And it is possible
that the rule of recognition authorizes our institutions to regard, as the 
supreme law of the land, a particular moral or political theory, the Supreme 
Court’s common law development of fundamental law, fundamental 
102. Id. at 90–91 (footnote omitted).  Any interpretive theory that posits a meaning
that is independent of the interpreter’s beliefs about that meaning will entail the 
possibility that the interpreter will err and thereby rely on the erroneous interpretation in 
ways that might prove costly if his interpretation is overturned.  That might be a reason
to refrain from following the correct interpretation where it will prove costly to those 
who relied on the erroneous one.  But it does not show that the erroneous interpretation was 
not erroneous. 

















   





   
 
values endorsed by social and political forces, or the authorially intended 
meanings of the authors of the original Constitution and its amendments. 
Only the practice theory is ruled out as a logical matter. 
But then, what is our rule of recognition?  I regard that question as one
of the two most difficult questions in legal philosophy.  But before I deal 
with the rule of recognition, let me say something about the other one of
the two most difficult questions.  That is the question of how it is 
possible for law to be normative. That question has both an external and
an internal dimension.  Externally, the question is how can we be obligated
to comply with the law when compliance conflicts with the deliverances 
of our first-order practical reasoning.  For if we cannot, then law cannot 
matter normatively, except insofar as it leads us to predict others’ 
conduct.104 
Internally, the question is what are we legally bound to do when the
institutions that we deem legally authoritative themselves get the law 
wrong. What if the Supreme Court misinterprets the Constitution? 
Originalists know this as the problem of nonoriginalist precedents.  But
the problem arises under any constitutional theory that contains a standard 
for constitutional correctness other than some institution’s ipse dixit. 
Back now to the rule of recognition.  For Hart, the rule of recognition 
was whatever criteria officials accepted as determinative of legal validity.105 
One would think, however, that citizens as well as officials would have 
to accept those criteria, lest the officials would be nothing more than 
“gunman writ large” vis-à-vis the citizens.106 
How then can we tell what rule of recognition the people have 
accepted?  Have, for example, the people accepted the Supreme Court’s
departures from the originalists’ Constitution?  They have generally
acquiesced in those departures, even ones that they have disliked.  But 
have they been aware that those departures were departures?107  Claims,
such as those by Ackerman, that the Constitution has been amended 
104. For a view that law matters only in this way, see LAURENCE CLAUS, LAW’S 
EVOLUTION AND HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 46–47, 168 (2012). 
105. See HART, supra note 103, at 97–98, 113. 
106. After all, Hart regarded it as a flaw in John Austin’s theory of law, which 
viewed laws as a sovereign’s commands backed by sanctions, that the theory could not 
distinguish laws from the threats of gunmen.  See id. at 20–25. 
107. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Rules of Recognition, Constitutional 
Controversies, and the Dizzying Dependence of Law on Acceptance, in  THE RULE OF 
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outside of the process it prescribes for its own amendment,108 to be
vindicated must be based on more than mere popular acquiescence and
more even than acquiescence plus approval on policy grounds.  But how 
do we test for that and discover what our rule of recognition is?  Until 
we know our rule of recognition, we cannot know the content of our 
Constitution.  But until we know otherwise, I, for one, am betting on the 
originalists’ Constitution. 
108. See ACKERMAN, supra note 42, at 41–47; see also Matthew D. Adler, Popular
Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 
NW. U. L. REV. 719, 720–22, 725 (2006); Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of
a Constitution, in  RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 145, 145 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). 
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